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The financial crisis of 2007 highlighted some tremendous flaws within the 
financial industry. In a little over a year, close to $8 trillion was wiped out from the 
U.S. economy with significant ripples sent through out the global economy. The 
world’s largest economy had fallen victim to one of the most exotic and complex of 
financial instruments in the global economy: derivatives. With a present day market 
valued over 5x the domestic GDP, financial derivatives still play a major role within 
the industry. Furthermore, a very significant portion of the derivatives market is 
traded “over-the-counter” with much less regulation. The derivatives market is still 
a significant player on the balance sheets of large financial institutions. As evident 
from the crisis, these institutions are pivotal factors to the health and vitality of our 
economy. Therefore, due to the immense size of the derivatives market and the vast 
influence of such instruments on our economy, serious reform, regulation, and risk 
evaluation was required to reign in the rampant market.  
For this paper, I will be analyzing the impact of the liquidity/credit crisis on 
derivative valuation. At the beginning of the 21st century, derivatives were a 
relatively new financial asset with little regulation and oversight. A derivative, in 
essence, “derives” its value from some underlying asset. Derivatives can be 
structured on assets such as equities, equity indices, foreign exchange rates, as well 
as interest rates. The market for derivatives expanded drastically in the years 
preceding the financial crisis, with all major banks holding stake in the market.  
Derivatives can also be customized to the needs for specific deals. This unique 
nature, coupled with minimal oversight, made derivatives a very appealing asset to 
financial institutions. The lack of regulation, however, created an immense amount 
of confusion surrounding the market for derivatives. 
In addition to the lack of regulation, financial institutions were creating a 
variety of instruments that were connected to derivatives. Out of the asset-backed 
securities, banks created Collateralized Debt Obligations. Additionally, banks would 
sell insurance on their liabilities in the form of Credit Default Swaps, an instrument 
used to protect institutions from loan defaults. Liabilities were being packaged and 
dispersed through out the market, but the risk was never minimized. Banks became 
highly leveraged and dependent on the web of liabilities, with no one analyzing the 
effects of default or risk. Therefore, when the payments for asset-backed securities 
dried up, institutions found themselves with minimal capital to fulfill short-term 
obligations. The banks had repackaged and sold a majority of their assets, leaving 
their balance sheets occupied with toxic assets. When the fear of default became a 
reality, many financial institutions became wary of the credit quality of their 
counterparts. This created a hoarding mentality as institutions doubted the 
credibility of counterparties and the demand for liquidity spiked. LIBOR, the 
determinant rate for borrowing in the short-term market, is also used to discount 
future cash flow payments, ultimately calculating a present value in all derivatives 
positions. When banks began hoarding, rates at which they lent rose significantly 
and drastically affecting derivative valuations. For years, collateralized derivatives 
were discounted at the LIBOR rate when it was believed to be “risk-free.” Now, 
financial institutions see the flaw in this rate and are transitioning to a multi-curve 
discount approach involving the Overnight-Indexed-Swap rates. Thus, I will be 
examining the impact of transitioning to OIS discounting on derivative valuation and 
the foreseeable effects on financial institutions. 
Derivatives and the Financial Crisis 
 The years leading up to the financial crisis were highlighted by the rise in 
asset-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations, and various other forms of 
exotic derivatives. The market for these financial instruments skyrocketed and 
quickly caught the attention of financial institutions. The largest player, mortgage-
backed securities, is considered the most instrumental component in the financial 
crisis. In essence, banks began pooling loans of mortgages from all across the 
country and slicing them in to tranches to then be sold to investors. These assets 
were attractive due to high rate of return offered on the payment of mortgages and 
the seemingly endless supply of mortgages loans. At this point, the real estate 
market in the United States was posting gains year after year, fueled by Fed 
sponsored low-interest rates that spanned every corner of the domestic market. In 
this credit expansion, capital flowed to those in need and created an influx of 
mortgages as people sought to capitalize on the gains in the real estate market. A 
vicious cycle was created, littered with textbook definitions of agency problems as 
financial institutions, loan originators, and ratings agents all acted on personal 
interest. Additionally, banks began highly-leveraging their financial statements by 
creating collateralized debt obligations from the original mortgage-backed 
securities. Instead of mitigating risk, this financial asset increased risk exponentially 
as more and more tranches of mortgages were split-up, repackaged, and sold into 
the marketplace. Banks became very leveraged with out anyone ever noticing the 
environment that had been created. No one ever stopped to analyze the effects of 
risk of default from the mortgage payments and how ensuing impact. Furthermore, 
a majority of these trades were funded through various forms of collateral and no 
one stopped to analyze the effect of a shortage of collateral to margin-funded 
transactions. According to Markus Brunnermeier, due to highly leveraged 
transaction and reliance on short-term capital, “any reduction in lending would 
cause significant stress on the system” (Brunnermeier). Unbeknown to the U.S. 
economy, a reduction in lending was imminent and would send the market in to a 
downward spiral. 
 During August 2007, liquidity in the mortgage market was drying up rapidly 
with companies like Countrywide facing severe pressure to roll over commercial 
paper. In fact, Countrywide issued a write-down of almost $11.5 billion due to the 
lack of funding. Analysts began reversing position on the stock, labeling the 
company with negative outlook. At the end of the week, shares of Countrywide had 
declined close to 15%, a 50% decline on the year. The shortage of liquidity in the 
market had made it near impossible to determine the fair value of mortgage-backed 
assets. In a recent study, the U.S. Government Pricing Agency estimated that up to 
95% of all lower-rated tranches were impaired due to the sub-prime mortgages. 
Add such market uncertainty to spiking interest rates and determining fair value for 
asset-backed securities became near impossible. During the same time period, BNP 
Paribas suspended three investment funds with over $2.2 billion assets between 
them – with “over 30% of all assets rated AA or higher” (GPO). The bank issued a 
statement saying “the complete evaporation of liquidity in certain market segments 
has made it impossible to value certain assets,” regardless of their quality of credit 
rating (GPO). The liquidity evaporated because banks became wary of the credit 
standing of other institutions. In this time, many institutions had balance sheets 
comprised of subpar assets. With default becoming a very possible scenario, banks 
tightened lending standards to preserve capital. Between the months of May and 
August, the market for asset-backed commercial paper shrank from $35 billion to $4 
billion. Furthermore, the average maturity of short-term loans declined over 25% as 
institutions assessed the credit-worthiness of counter parties in shorter intervals. 
Uncertainty among financial institutions increased from2007 to 2008, sending 
interest rates to record levels, and further complicating the valuation for derivative 
transactions. 
LIBOR/TED 
 Until this point, the prices for all derivatives were discounted using LIBOR as 
the risk-free rate. LIBOR is an acronym that stands for London Interbank Offered 
Rate. It is the “average interest rate estimated by leading banks in London that they 
would be charged if borrowing from other banks” (Risk.net). Comprised of 16 
leading banks, the group determines the LIBOR rate by providing bids for the 
interest rates they would offer to other prominent banks. Although it was first used 
in 1984, LIBOR has become the prominent rate for determining borrowing rates 
among financial institutions, In today’s market, the 16 banks that determine LIBOR 
“have placed rates on a staggering $360 trillion financial instruments across the 
globe”(Risk). Essentially, LIBOR is a very prominent rate and has significant impact 
on the financial markets. While discarding outliers in the calculation, the LIBOR rate 
provides an illustration for liquidity in the market on differing maturities. Most 
institutions adhered to the principal that all cash flows received by the institution 
from derivatives should be discounted at the rate that banks would need to fund the 
transaction. This belief also held true for transactions of all maturities. For the years 
preceding the crisis, all banks believed that capital would be readily available to 
borrow at LIBOR. Yet, the credit and liquidity aspects of the financial crisis proved 
LIBOR to be unreliable as a risk free rate. The toxic assets that comprised so many 
financial statements and balance sheets created uncertainty among major banks. 
Many institutions did not trust their counterparties and therefore offered record-
breaking rates to determine the new LIBOR rate. The easy lending policies that 
fueled the housing boom began to change.  
In the beginning, housing prices declined across the country and many 
people saw their equity stakes in homes fall drastically. Delinquencies on mortgages 
were rampant and loan payments dried up quickly. Therefore, the financial assets 
that converted such loans in to securities began to fall. The various CDOs that were 
created from dozens mezzanine tranches across a series of asset-backed securities 
followed suit. Additionally, high percentages of these derivatives were funded 
through margin. When a bank cannot meet margin requirements, it must default in 
the transaction. According to the Federal Reserve, banks were “concerned about the 
size and location of the exposure to subprime-related assets and decided to stop 
lending to other banks”(Federal Reserve). Banks began scrambling to scrap together 
any readily available capital that could be posted as collateral for the transactions. 
Unfortunately, banks began to fail as capital requirements could not be met and 
bankruptcy was forced upon them. Consequently, the market for short-term loans 
began to dry up as institutions attempted to roll over obligations. The result was a 
LIBOR rate that spiked drastically, sending the TED spread to an unprecedented 460 
basis points. The TED spread is the difference between LIBOR and the Federal 
Funds Rate. Any spike in this rate signals distress within the economy and a lack of 
trust among bank lenders. With a record-breaking LIBOR rate, financial derivatives 
and all related cash flows would be priced far below fair value. LIBOR could not 
longer be considered a risk-free rate. 
 
  The fall of Lehman Brothers in 2008 sent the market in to frenzy. Lehman 
Brothers had over 900,000 derivatives contracts outstanding, with over 150,000 
attached to other prominent investment banks. The possibility of default became 
evident within every bank that held toxic assets. Prominent institutions began 
doubting counterparts and uncertainty impacted the borrowing rates. As interest 
rates soared, skepticism in the derivatives market grew and trading grinded to a 
near halt. Banks began liquidating positions in derivatives transactions, as well as 
the credit default swaps used to hedge those transactions. The bid-ask spread for 
OTC transactions soared as banks became wary of the credit worthiness of their 
counterparties. Banks began a flight for quality in an attempt to relieve their 
institutions of the toxic assets and regain credible standing within the markets. Two 
important characteristics forced financial institutions to reevaluate their exposure 
to derivatives: a sharp increase in short-term interest rates and further uncertainty 
of the intrinsic value of derivatives. 
 
OIS and Derivative Valuation 
The graph above provides an illustration for the “global reach of the liquidity 
crisis around the financial crisis and makes clear that a spread that has been 
constant for years can suddenly explode” (Jens van Egmond). Previously the LIBOR 
rate had been known for representing the risk-free rate and offering a prediction for 
the liquidity environment. Yet, during the peak of the crisis, banks began hoarding 
funds and severely hindering capital lending for fear of bankruptcy. The downfall of 
Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers reacquainted fear in to the market. Now, the 
question of derivative valuation becomes a concern and financial institutions must 
configure a more reliable approach to discounting future cash flows. For instance, 
the collateral aspect of derivatives must also be revalued. Banks and large 
institutions that dealt with derivatives began paying closer attention to the 
collateralized side of transactions. For example, an interest rate swap starts out with 
an intrinsic value of zero. It isn’t until some time until one party of the transaction 
has a negative value and owes money to the other party. These payments are 
recorded mark-to-market in order to reflect the true value of the transaction. The 
party with a negative value must acquire funds to post as collateral in the 
transaction. The cost of funding this capital is the adequate rate to discount all 
future cash flows. When liquidity is scarce, the cost of funding the capital increases, 
effectively decreasing the value of all future cash flows. Furthermore, an interest 
rate is provided on the payment to reflect the value of the payment as one party 
holds it. This interest rate is known as the overnight interest rate (OIS) and is the 
average rate that is charged for loans in the overnight market. In the United States, 
the applicable overnight rate is the effective Federal Funds rate. According to the St. 
Louis Federal Reserve, the OIS market provides little risk because “there is no 
exchange of principal; funds are exchanged only at the maturity of contract, when 
one party pays the net interest obligation to the other” (St. Louis Fed). The LIBOR 
rate is greatly affected by an increase in illiquidity while the OIS remains relatively 
more stable. Before the crisis, the difference between LIBOR and OIS was a mere 7 
basis points. During the crisis, however, the LIBOR-OIS spread spiked to record-
breaking numbers. Banks became uncertain of default within the lending market 
and charged higher interest rates when lending to other banks. The LIBOR-OIS can 
presumably be an indicator on the health of the banking industry and “a barometer 
of fear for bank insolvency”  (St. Louis Fed).  
 
Valuation Implications 
 Due to the stressed conditions of the market, the LIBOR
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provides risk management and lessens the possibility of credit risk for firms that are 
“in-the-money”.  When a firm is out-of-the money, capital must be posted to ensure 
margin requirements for the transaction. Hence, recent reform has created Credit 
Support Anexes as one part of the ISDA Master Agreement in attempt to mitigate 
risk among derivative transactions. This reform provides specific instructions for 
capital requirements on a given transaction. For large institutions, posting capital to 
meet standards requires borrowing at the overnight rate. Therefore, the overnight 
rate is the cost that large institutions must incur to secure funding for cash-
collateral transactions. There are, however, various forms of collateral in derivative 
transactions. Reform and regulation will provide transparency to the derivatives 
market as institutions learn more about the assets.  
 Changing the valuation of an entire industry is complex and time-consuming. 
Bootstrapping and rebuilding a 30-year LIBOR model is noticeably different than 
creating a long-term curve for OIS rates. On average, the LIBOR-OIS spread hovers 
around 7 basis points when the markets are relatively stable. Long-term curves 
begin to differ and provide noticeable changes in present value calculations with 
LIBOR providing the lower value. Obviously, differences in in valuations will create 
confusion in the market as institutions transition to OIS. Recently, institutions 
revalued their derivative portfolios and returned varied results. BNP Paribas 
released a news report that the bank took a “108 million Euro hit during the switch 
to OIS discounting” (Risk). Morgan Stanley, on the other hand, reported a net gain on 
principal transactions. Fluctuations in derivative values will also vary based on the 
volume and type of derivatives in the transaction. While new trades may be quoted 
with fresh OIS discounting, older transactions must be revalued to reflect the price 
of any off-market swaps. Less-sophisticated firms may find it more difficult to 
implement a new valuation system within the company. Banks and dealers are 
requesting “LCH Clearnet will need to make some changes to support the 
establishment of the new pricing standard” (The Price is Wrong). Currently, LCH 
calculates collateral on interest payments with OIS, but uses LIBOR when 
discounting future cash flows. Consensus is needed from the regulatory bodies to 
create more a more efficient derivatives market. Although price discrepancies are 
not damaging now, further confusion surrounding derivatives transaction might 
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